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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
CALIFORXIA PACI~IXG CORPORATION,
a corporation,
Plaintiff,
YS.

No. 6305

IXDlTSTRL-\.L CO~I~IISSIOX OF UTAH,
and JUAXITA LE\VIS JOHNSON,
Defendants.

PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF
STATE~IENT

OF THE CASE

This is an original proceeding in this court for the
purpose of reviewing an award made by the Industrial
Commission of the State of Utah against this plaintiff
and in favor of Juanita Lewis Johnson, and the findings
and conclusions of said Commission upon which said
award is predicated, dated July 29, 1940, in the m~tter
designated by said Commission as Claim No. 4270. After
petition for rehearing had been duly filed by the plaintiff herein within the time allowed by law, and after the
same had been denied by the Commission,- plaintiff herein, within due time, applied to this court for the issuance
of a writ of certiorari, which writ was issued by this
court, and to which writ return has been made to this
court.
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It having been admitted that J. Frank Johnson, the
deceased, suffered injuries arising out of and in the
course of his employment with the plaintiff, and that
from said injuries he subsequently died, there is no question but that his widow, Juanita Lewis Johnson, is entitled to benefits for herself and minor children. This
case, accordingly, involves the sole question as to the
extent of the benefits the said Juanita Lewis Johnson
is entitled to for herself and said minor children.
The Commission awarded benefits to her in the sum of
$21.84 a week. It is the contention of the plaintiff that
there is no evidence to support the award of the Commission in such an amount per week, and that the uncontradicted evidence shows that the award should not have
been in any sum greater than $19.73 per week.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
While this matter was pending before the Commission the respective parties filed with the Commission an
agreed statement of the material facts, and submitted
the matter to the Commission for decision upon such
agreed statement. By such statement the following facts
were agreed :
1. That the deceased died as a result of an injury
suffered by him on October 13, 1939, while in the course
of his employment with the plaintiff.
2. That at the time of his injury and death, his widow, the defendant, Juanita Lewis Johnson, and eight
minor children were wholly dependent upon him for their
support and maintenance.
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3. That plaintiff wn:-; subject to i lw \Vorkmeu '~
Compensation ~\d of Utah, and that it W:ls a sPlf-insurPr.

-±. That plaintiff operated it:-; business eaeh week from
the "·eek ending October 8, 1939, to the wPek ending October 1--l-, 193~1, the follo"·ing number of da~'s:
\Veek ending October 8, ln:)8, 5- 1/:! days.
\Veek ending October 15, 1938, 5112 days.
\Veek ending Odober 22, 1938, 5112 days.
\Yeek ending Oetober 29, 1938, 5112 days.
\Y eek ending X ovember 5, 1938, 51h days.
\V eek ending November 12, 1938, 5112 days.
\Veek ending X ovember 19, 1938, 5 days.
\V eek ending X ovember 26, 1938, 5 days.
\V eek ending December 3, 1938, 5 days.
\Y eek ending December 10, 1938, 5 days.
\Y eek ending December 17, 1938, 5 days.
\Y eek ending December 24, 1938, 5 days.
\Y eek ending December 31, 1938, 6 days.
\Y eek ending January 7, 1939, 5 days.
\Veek ending January 14, 1939, 5112 days.
\Yeek ending J anuery 21, 1939, 5 days.
\V eek ending January 28, 1939, 5 days.
\\T eek ending February 4, 1939, 5 days.
\Yeek ending February 11, 1939, 5 days.
\Y eek ending February 18, 1939, 5 days.
\Veek ending February 25, 1939, 5 days.
\Veek ending ~larch 4, 1939, 5 days.
\V eek ending :March 11, 1939, 5 days.
\\T eek ending 1\Iarch 18, 1939, 5 days.
\Veek ending March 25, 1939, 6 days.
Week ending April 1, 1939, 5112 days.
vVeek ending April 8, 1939, 5112 days.
Week ending April 15, 1939, 5 days.
\Veek ending April 22, 1939, 5112 days.
Week ending April 29, 1939, 5112 days.
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Week ending May 6, 1939, 51!2 days.
Week ending May 13, 1939, 51!2 days.
Week ending May 20, 1930, 51j2 days.
Week ending May 27, 1939, 51!2 days.
Week ending June 3, 1939, 6 days.
Week ending June 10, 1939, 5 days.
Week ending June 17, 1939, 51!2 days.
Week ending June 24, 1939, 6 days.
Week ending July 1, 1939, 6 days.
\V eek ending July 8, 1939, 7 days.
Week ending ,July 15, 1939, 7 days.
Week ending tT uly 22, 1939, 6 days.
Week ending July 29, 1939, 5 days.
\Veek ending August 5, 1939, 6 days.
Week ending August 12, 1939, 6 days.
Week ending August 19, 1939, 6 days.
Week ending August 26, 1939, 6 days.
"\Veek ending September 2, 1939, 6 days.
Week ending September 9, 1939, 7 days.
\V eek ending September 16, 1939, 7 days.
Week ending September 23, 1939, 7 days.
Week ending September 30, 1939, 7 days.
Week ending October 7, 1939, 7 days.
Week ending October 14, 1939, 7 days.
5. That plaintiff's record showed the following work
record of the deceased with plaintiff:
WORK RECORD OF J. FRANK JOHNSON
SEC. No. 529-01-3273
One year period-Oct. 15, 1938 to Oct. 14, 1939, Inc.
1938 Week End. Amt. Hrs. Worked Days Worked
10-15
$ 3.80
8
1
10-22
9.99
21
3
54.60 Two wks. period
U.I.S. 10-19 to 31
less 3 days above
11-1
to
15
63.00
Two wks. period
"

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
\Yeek End. Amt. Hrs. \Y orked Days
10-16 to 30
63.00 Two wk8. period
63.00
",, 1:2-1 to 13
"
"
"
12-16 to 31
58.00
"
"
"
C.P.C.1:2-31
7.13
16
1939
1-7
15.20
32
1-1-l
..J.-l
20.90
1-21
19.00
40
1-28
19.00
40
2--l
3.80
8
2-11
X one
2-18
None
2-23
18.28
381f2
3--l
19.00
40
. 19.12
3-11
401f2
3-18
19.00
40
3-25
19.00
40
-l-1
19.00
40
4-8
3.80
8
4-15
19.00
40
-l-22
19.00
40
4-29
19.00
40
5-6
19.00
40
5-13
19.01
40
5-20
19.00
40
5-27
19.00
40
6-3
15.20
32
6-10
19.00
40
403)1.
6-17
19.36
6-24
20.90
44
513)1.
7-1
24.58
7-8
44.31
931/i
641)1.
7-15
30.53
7-22
19.24
401f2
7-29
17.10
36
8-5
17.10
36

1938

Worked

r.r.s.

2
4

51f2
5
5
1

5
5
5
5
5

5
1
5

5
5
5
5

5
5
4

5
5

51f2
6
6
7

5

4 1/2
4 1/2
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1939

Week End.
8-12
8-19
8-26
9-2
9-9
9-16
9-23
9-30
10-7
10-14

Amt. Hrs. Worked
20.90
44
23.04
481!2
673~
32.18
36.11
76
32.54
681!2
903~
43.10
47.16
991~
39.90
84
32.43
681~
29.92
63
$913.63

Days \Y or ked
51f2
6
6
6
6
7
7

7
6
6

18951~

6. That the deceased, at the time of his injury and
prior thereto, was being paid 471!2 cents per hour for
his labor.
STATEMENT OF ERRORS
In making its award the Commission based the same
upon its finding that the plaintiff's business "was being
carried on 7 days per week.'' Plaintiff contends that
there is no evidence to support such finding, and further
that such a finding will not support an award using as
the basis thereof seven day employment per week; that
the uncontradicted evidence and the only evidence, namely, the stipulation of facts, shows that the usual operation of plaintiff's business was less than six days per
week, and the basis for determining ''average weekly
wage,'' which in turn is the basis used in determining
benefi!s, is not the number of days plaintiff's business
was operated at the time of the injury, but on the contrary is the "usual operation" of plaintiff's business.
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ARGUl\IENT
Sl'dion -1:2-1-6-1, ReYised Statutes of Utah, 1933, as
amended by Chapter 51, Laws of l'tnh, 1939, provides as
follows:
''In case injury causes death within the period of three years, the employer or insurance
carrier shall pay the burial expenses of the deceased as provided herein, and further benefits in
the amounts and to the persons as follows:
(1) *****

(2) If there are wholly dependent persons at
the time of the death, the payment shall be 60 per
cent of the average weekly wage, but not to exceed a maximum of $16 per week, plus 10 per cent
of said award for each dependent minor child
under the age of eighteen years, up to and including five such dependent minor children, to continue for the remainder of the period between the
date of the death and six years after the date of
the injury, and shall not amount to more than a
maximum of $7,500 or less than a minimum of
$2,000.00.
(3) *****

(-1) *****"
It being agreed that there were wholly dependent
persons upon the deceased at the time of death, the foregoing is the statute applicable to the instant award. Pursuant to it, the award in the instant case should have been
60 per cent of the average weekly wage, plus an additional 50 percent of such award for the minor children. Accordingly, in reaching the amount of the award it is necc>~ary that ''the average weekly wage'' be determined.
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Section 42-1-70, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, as
amended by Chapter 41, Laws of Utah, 1937, provides
as follows:
"The average weekly wage of the injured
person at the time of injury shall be taken as the
basis upon which to compute benefits. Employment shall mean pursuit in the usual trade, business or profession of the employer. Five and
one-half or six day employment shall mean pursuit in the usual trade, business or profession, the
usual operation of which is six days or less per
week. Seven-day employment shall mean pursuit
in the usual trade, business or profession, the usual operation of which is seven days per week.
The average weekly wage shall be determined as
follows:
(1) Determine the contract of hire existing
at the time of the injury, whether upon year,
month, week, day, hour or piece basis.
( 2) Determine whether the employment is
operated on a five and one-half, six or seven day
basis.
(3) Determine daily wage as follows:
(a) If the wage is on an annual basis, and the
employment is seven days per week, divide the
amount of the annual salary by 364. Resultdaily wage. If the employment is five and one
half or six days per week, divide the amount of
the annual salary by 312. Result-daily wage.
(b) If the wage is on a monthly basis, multiply monthly salary by 12 and proceed as above,
in (a) to determine daily wage.
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(c) If the 'Yagp is on a daily basis no rule is
required.
(d) If the wage is on an hourly basis, multiply the pay per hour by the number of hours employment regularly operates or, if operation is not
r~gular, use eight hours as a day.
(e) If the wage is on a piece basis, use the
aYerage daily earnings for a reasonable period in
which employment has been regular, and diYide
the amount earned by the number of days worked
in such period. If the duration of employment
has been too short to determine as above, then use
the wage of an average employee, taking into consideration the experience of such employee, and
determine as above in (a).
(f) If the wage is on part-time basis, and the
employment is regular, extend the wage to fulltime basis, or use the wage the injured would earn
if working full time in such employment, and determine as above, in (a).
(g) The minimum number of days per year
to be used in determining the average weekly
wage shall be 240. Where the number of days of
employment exceeds 240 days per year the average weekly wage shall be determined as provided
in Paragraph 4 hereof.
( 4) To determine average weekly wage, if
the employment is five days per week multiply
the daily wage as determined by the foregoing
method by 250 and divide by 52. If the employment is five and one-half or six days per week,
multiply the daily wage, as determined by the
foregoing method, by 300 and divide by 52. If
the employment is seven days per week, multiply
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the daily wage, as determined above, by 332 and
divide by 52.
( 5) To determine weekly compensation, let
D represent daily wage:
D

X

D

X

If 5112 or 6 days of employment per week300 X .60
.
= weekly compensation
52
If 7 days of employment per week332 X .60
= weekly compensation
52

(6) To determine daily compensation, di,,idP
weekly compensation by 7."
The stipulation shows that the deceased was paid
an hourly wage of 471j2 cents, and that the number of
hours per day he worked was irregular. Accordingly,
subsection (3) (d) above applies; namely, his daily wage
is to be determined by multiplying 471/2 cents an hour by
eight hours. This results in a daily wage of $3.80, and
is the amount used by the Commission in determining
weekly compensation. Plaintiff does not dispute the
correctness of using $3.80 as the '' D '' in the formula.
The formula used by the Commission in arriving at the
amount of deceased's weekly compensation, however, is
the formula for seven day employment per week, namely, D x 332 x .60. By using this formula (the D peing
52
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the daily wage of $~t80) the Commission found, upon
increasing the result of the formula 50 percent for the
minor children, the amount of \YPeldy eompensation in
the sum of $~1.84. Plaintiff contends that the formula
the Commission should haYc used i~ the formula for 51/2
or 6 day employment per w0ck, namely, D x 300 x .60,

52
the D being the daily wage of $3.80. The use of thus
formula results, when such result is increased by fifty
percent for the minor children, in weekly compensation
of $19.73, which amount, plaintiff submits, is the correct
amount of weekly compensation that the Commission
::-:hould haYe a-warded.
As to whether the formula for 5Y2 or 6 days of employment per week should be used, as claimed by the
plaintiff, or whether the formula for 7 days of employment per week, as used by the Commission, should be
used as the basis of determining weekly compensation,
depends upon the interpretation of Section 42-1-70, supra. It will be noted that such section contains the following language :
"Five and one-half or six-day employment
shall mean pursuit in the usual trade, business or
profession, the usual operation of which is six
days or less per week. Seven-day employment
shall mean pursuit in the usual trade, business or
profession, the usual operation of which is seven
days per week.''
In other words, if the usual operation of plaintiff's
lm~iness is six days or less per week, the deceased's employment in connection therewith is ''five and one-half
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or six day employment,'' while if the usual operation of
plaintiff's business is seven days per week, the deceased's employment in connection therewith is ''seven
day employment,'' as those terms are used in the foregoing section of the statute. In order to determine the
usual operation of plaintiff's business reference need
only be made to the stipulation of facts, wherein the work
record of plaintiff for 54 weeks immediately prior to the
deceased's injury is set out. It therein appears that during such 54 week period the operation of plaintiff's business consisted of 19 five day weeks, 16 five and one-half
day weeks, 11 six day weeks, and 8 seven day weeks.
But eight weeks out of such 54 week period did plaintiff's
business operate seven days per week, while 46 weeks
out of such 34 week period plaintiff's business operated
six days or less per week. A simple mathematical calculation shows that the average operating week for
plaintiff during such period was less than 5.69 days per
week. It is obvious, therefore, that the usual operation
of plaintiff's business was less than six days per week,
and the formula that should have been used by the Commission is D x 300 x .60, and the amount of compensa-

52
tion that should have been awarded per week is $19.73.
It is true that plaintiff's business was operating 7 days
per week at the time of the injury to deceased, but the
statute does not make that the test. The test_ is the
llsual operation, not the factual operation at any particular time.
There can be no question as to the meaning of the
word ''usual.'' It does not mean that which is out of
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the ordinary, but rather that which is customary. This
plaintiff, at the time of the injury, as well as prior and
subsequent thereto, was engaged in canning, and it is a
matter of common knowledge that in the very nature
of things a canning busines involves a seasonal operation. Concerned as it is with seasonal and highly perishable agricultural products, which when ripe must be
speedily processed, it has on that account periods of
operation, e-..;en during the canning season, which are out
of the ordinary course of business and which are usually
spoken of as peak periods. Such peak periods, one of
which is shown by the stipulation as occuring at the
time Qf the accident in question, cannot, by any stretch
of language, be con trued to be the plaintiff's normal
period of operation even during the canning season itself,
much less its usual annual operation.
That the Commission, in making its award, misconstrued the statutory test is apparent in its findings
of fact. The only fact found by the Commission relative
to the operation of plaintiff's business is found in Paragraph IV of such findings of fact, namely:
''The employer's business (at the time of
deceased's injury) was being carried on 7 days
per week.''
No finding as to the usual operation of plaintiff's business was made-but only the finding with respect to
the operation at the time of the injury.
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CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we respectfully submit that the findings of fact will not support the award made, nor any
award for that matter, for the reason that there is a
total failure on the part of the Commission to find with
respect to the ''usual operation'' of plaintiff's business;
and we further submit, that if the finding made by the
Commission should be construed as a sufficient finding
of the necessary fact, the same will not support the
award made for the reason that the uncontradicted evidence shows that the usual operation of plaintiff's business was less than six days per week.
Respectfully submitted,

DeVINE, HOWELL & STINE
NEIL R. OLl\ISTEAD
Attorneys for Plaintiff .
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